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Quantum cryptography with the predetermined key was
experimentally realized using Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen(EPR)
correlations of continuously bright optical beams. Only one
of two EPR correlated beams is transmitted with the sig-
nals modulated on quadrature phases and amplitudes, and
the other one is retained by the authorized receiver. The
modulated small signals are totally submerged in the large
quantum noise of the signal beam, therefore nobody except
the authorized receiver can decode the signals. Usability of
imperfect quantum correlation, high transmission and detec-
tion efficiencies, and security provided by quantum mechanics
are the favorable features of the presented scheme.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd,03.67.Hk, 42.50.Dv,89.70.+c
Quantum cryptography (QC) provides a way for two
distant parties(Alice and Bob) to share keys for encryp-
tion that can be absolutely secret in principle comparing
to the classical ones in which their security is based on
the conjectured computational difficulty of certain func-
tions. The fundamental properties of quantum mechan-
ics, Heisenberg uncertainty principle, provide the secu-
rity of QC. The first complete protocol for quantum key
distribution (QKD) using four polarization states of a
photon pulse was proposed in 1984 by Charles Bennett
and Gilles Brassard (named BB84) [1]. The majority
of proposals and all implemented experiments for QKD
so far have focused on the use of discrete variables to
transmit information [1–6]. Although discrete systems
have the advantage to be loss insensitive, also have a
number of disadvantages in working with single photons,
particularly the strong restrictions on data transmission
rates and the poor efficiency of detection. In recent
years the cryptographic schemes employing continuous
coherent and nonclassical light fields have been suggested
[7–15]. A lot of interest has arisen in continuous vari-
able quantum cryptography (CVQC) with EPR beams
due to that the experimental demonstrations of quantum
teleportation [16] and quantum dense coding [17,18] for
continuous variables (CV). J.Kimble and his colleagues
completed the quantum communication of dual channels
with correlated nonclassical states of light [13]. However
in this case, an eavesdropper (Eve) could simultaneously
access the signal and idler beams without the knowledge
of the legitimate receiver. So far, to the best of our knowl-
edge, there is no experimental demonstration on CVQC.
In this letter we present a scheme using the nonlocal
correlation of bright EPR beams to implement QC, in
which the source generating EPR beams is placed inside
the receiver, only one of the EPR correlated beams (sig-
nal beam) is sent to Alice and other one (idler beam)
is retained by Bob. The security of the presented sys-
tem is directly provided by EPR correlations between
amplitude and phase quadratures of continuous bright
optical beams and no-cloning of quantum fluctuations.
Any random choice on measurements of quadratures are
not needed and the sender encodes the key string with
predetermined binary bits [11]. All transmitted bits are
used for constituting the key string without bit rejection,
thus the transmission efficiency of 100% may be achieved
in principle.
It has been theoretically and experimentally demon-
strated [17–20] that bright EPR beams with anticor-
related amplitude quadratures and correlated phase
quadratures may be produced by a continuous nonde-
generate optical parametric amplifier(NOPA) operating
at deamplification. The calculated normalized fluctua-
tion variances of the amplitude quadratures for the out-
put modes from NOPA are [21]
〈
δ2(X1)
〉
=
〈
δ2(Y1)
〉
=
〈
δ2(X2)
〉
=
〈
δ2(Y2)
〉
=
e2r + e−2r
2
(1)
and the quantum correlation variances between the
quadratures are〈
δ2(X1 +X2)
〉
=
〈
δ2(Y1 − Y2)
〉
= 2e−2r (2)
where r(0 ≤ r ≤ +∞) is the correlation parameter be-
tween modes 1 and 2 which depends on the strength and
the time of parametric interaction, r = 0 without correla-
tion, r > 0 with partial correlation, r → ∞ with perfect
correlation.
Here we have assumed that the two modes are totally
balanced during the process of measurements. The mod-
ulated signals at given radio frequencies (rf) can be con-
sidered as a noise δXS(Ω) and δYS(Ω). When the pow-
ers of δXS(Ω) and δYS(Ω) are smaller than the original
quantum noise power of the signal beam (Eq.(1)) and
larger than the correlation noise power (Eq.(2)), the sig-
nals are submerged in the noise background of the signal
beam (X1, Y1) and can be decoded with the correspon-
dent idler beam (X2, Y2) of the EPR beams. Thus, the
strength
〈
δ2XS
〉
of the modulated signals should satisfy
the following inequalities:
2e−2r(Ω) <
〈
δ2XS(Ω)
〉
<
e2r(Ω) + e−2r(Ω)
2
(3)
2e−2r(Ω) <
〈
δ2YS(Ω)
〉
<
e2r(Ω) + e−2r(Ω)
2
1
From Eqs.(1) and (2), it is obvious, when r > 0.27 the
variances of signal beam(Eq.(1)) are higher than that of
the correlation fluctuations(Eq.(2)). The larger the cor-
relation parameter is, the higher the noise power of the
signal beam is and the lower the correlation variance is.
For a perfect transmission line of noiseless the correla-
tion parameter of the NOPA should be larger than 0.27
at least for accomplishing the QC. At Bob station, the
signals XS(Ω) and YS(Ω) modulated on the amplitude
and phase quadratures of signal beam (X1, Y1) are de-
coded with the retained idler beam by means of the direct
detection of photocurrents [17,18].
Fig.1 is the schematic of the QC system. The EPR
source, NOPA, is placed inside the Bob receiving sta-
tion. The one of the bright EPR correlated beams, the
signal beam (X1, Y1), is sent to the Alice sending station
where Alice encodes the transmitted information on the
amplitude and phase quadratures by the choice of the
modulation types with the binary bit values, for exam-
ple the modulated amplitude signals stands for “1”and
the phase signals for “0”. Then the encoded signal beam
is transmitted back to Bob where the information is de-
coded by the retained other one of the EPR correlated
beams.
The configuration of NOPA and scheme producing the
bright beams with anticorrelation of amplitude quadra-
tures and correlation of phase quadratures were same as
that used in the experiment of the quantum dense coding
which was described in detail in our previous publication
[17]. Locking the relative phase between the pump laser
and injected seed wave of NOPA to (2n + 1)pi, where n
is integer, to enforce the NOPA operating at deamplifi-
cation, the entangled EPR beams were generated. The
output field from NOPA is splitted into the signal and
idler beams by a polarized-beam-splitter (PBS), then the
signal beam is sent to Alice and the idler beam is retained
by Bob. The phase shifter (PS), the 50-50 beam splitter
(BS), a pair of photodiodes D1 and D2, and the power
combiners (+/-) in Bob station constitute the direct de-
tection system of Bell-state for measuring the variances
of the amplitude sum and phase difference between the
two quadratures simultaneously [17,18]. The PS imposes
a phase difference of pi/2 between signal and idler beams
before they are mixed on BS [18].
A secretly encoded and transmitted binary bit string is
summarized in Table I. At the time points t1, t2...t6, Alice
encodes the signal beam and sends it back to Bob, then
Bob simultaneously measures the amplitude and phase
modulation signals. The measured amplitude signals at
t1, t4, t5 stand for “1”, the phase singles at t2, t3, t6 for
“0”. The upper traces are the spectral densities of noise
power of the SNL(Shot-Noise-Limit) for the EPR beams
which is used to evaluate the quantum correlations. The
middle traces are the noise spectra of signal beam in
which the modulated signals are submerged in the noise
background totally and the lower traces are the variances〈
δ2(X1 +X2)
〉
and
〈
δ2(Y1 − Y2)
〉
, which are 3.8dBm be-
low the noise level of the SNL of the EPR beams, and
the secret signals modulated at 2MHz emerge from the
squeezed noise backgrounds. A secret key string charac-
terized by the binary bit values 100110 is obtained.
In experiments, we should pay attention on matching
the optical distances between the signal and idler beams
to reach optimum correlation and detection efficiency.
Especially for long distance transmission one must add
optical retarder and attenuator in the idler beam retained
by Bob to make its travel distance from EPR source to
the beam splitter of the detection system and the de-
tected intensity approximately equal to that of the sig-
nal beam. Recently, the schemes on storing quantum
entanglement in atomic spins system or in cavity QED
have been presented [22,23], that probably can provide a
practical technique for retaining an EPR component in
Bob.
The intensity fluctuations of signal and idler fields
of the bright EPR beams generated by the NOPA are
quantum-correlated at any instant and nobody can make
or copy a light field which has the identical quantum fluc-
tuations, which provide the mechanism of security for the
CVQC system. In experiment, the SNR(signal to noise
ratio) of the decoded signals depends on the original cor-
relation of EPR beams and the losses of a given trans-
mission line, which is independent of Alice’s bit value.
Any decrease of the measured SNR and the correlation
degree relative to the predicted results alerts Bob to the
additional loss caused by a partial tapping of the signal
channel, perhaps by Eve. If Eve wants to perform the
quantum-nondemonlition-measurment (QND) on one of
the amplitude-phase quadratures of the signal beam, the
other quadrature must be disturbed and the disturbance
must be reflected on the measured results of Bob. The
deviation would indicate the possibility that Eve have
performed a QND. More quantitative analyses on pro-
tecting against the optical tap attack of Eve have been
presented in the previous publications [10–13] and can be
used in the discussion to the presented protocol.
A possible eavesdropping scheme using fake EPR
beams is shown in Fig.2. Eve intercepts totally the signal
beam (X1, Y1) and transmits a fake signal beam (X
′
1, Y
′
1 )
produced by a fake EPR source(EPR2) in her station to
Alice. Alice has no ability to recognize the fake beam.
She modulates the information on it and then sends out
as usual. Eve intercepts the beam with messages again
and decodes the information with the other one of the
fake EPR correlated beams (X
′
2, Y
′
2 ) retained by her.
At the same time she modulates the real signal beam
(X1, Y1) according to the intercepted bit values and sends
it back to Bob who also does not know that the informa-
tion has been intercepted. To reveal this type of quantum
interception Alice may randomly block the signal beam
with a photoelectric detector (Do) connected to an oscil-
loscope at some appointed time points tk for a short time
interval ∆tk during the duration of transmission. The
shape of intensity fluctuation of the signal beam at the
blocked moment can be recorded as a function of time by
an oscilloscope (OS1). In Bob station, the photocurrent
2
of the sum of the amplitude quadratures
〈
δ2(X1 +X2)
〉
is splitted to two parts by a power splitter, one is sent to a
spectrum analyzer (SA) for the noise spectrum measure-
ment and other one to an oscilloscope (OS2) for recording
the fluctuation of photocurrents. If there is no Eve be-
tween Alice and Bob, while the signal beam is blocked by
Do the oscilloscope OS2 in Bob station records the inten-
sity fluctuation of the idler beam
〈
δ2X2(t)
〉
which is anti-
correlated with
〈
δ2X1(t)
〉
recorded by OS1 at same time
and the correlation extent only depends on the quality
of the EPR source (EPR1) and the losses of transmis-
sion line. Fig.3 shows the intensity fluctuation shapes
of
〈
δ2X1(t)
〉
(trace1) and
〈
δ2X2(t)
〉
(trace2) simultane-
ously recorded by OS1 and OS2 respectively. The partial
anticorrelation between the shapes of the fluctuations is
very obvious and the measured root-mean-square (rms)
noise voltages for the sum and difference of traces 1 and 2
are 568.64µv and 655.29µv respectively. For two uncorre-
lated beams, the rms voltages for sum and difference pho-
tocurrents should be equal, thus the deviation between
rms voltages of the sum and difference also shows the
presence of quantum correlation. If Eve interrupts the
real signal beam, the intensity fluctuations of
〈
δ2X
′
1(t)
〉
recorded by Alice at the blocked moment are totally not
correlated with that recorded by OS2 at same time. After
a set of communication is finished, Alice publicly sends
the wave shapes of intensity fluctuation and the rms volt-
ages recorded by OS1 to Bob, where Bob compares with
that recorded by himself with OS2 at same time points.
The absence of anticorrelation between the two sets of
fluctuation shapes and the same rms voltages for the sum
and difference indicate the presence of Eve.
At last we have to mention that in the practical com-
munication of long distance the question of preserving
the entanglement of the initial EPR state is a fascinat-
ing one for continuous quantum variables due to the in-
evitable losses in transmission lines and the sensitivity
of the quantum correlation to losses. However the us-
ability of experimentally accessible quantum correlation,
relatively high security and efficiency, and the simplic-
ity of the configuration make this scheme valuable to be
considered for developing CVQC.
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Captions of figures:
Fig.1 The schematic of the quantum cryptography us-
ing the EPR beams
AM-amplitude modulator, PM-phase modulator,
RNG-random number generator, SA-spectrum ana-
lyzer, PS-phase shifter, BS-beamsplitter of 50%, PBS-
polarization beamsplitter, NOPA-nondegenerate optical
parametric amplifier.
Fig.2 Diagram of eavesdropping Scheme using fake
EPR beams
EPR1, EPR2-Sources of EPR beams, AM, PM-
Amplitude and phase modulators, SA-spectral analyzer,
OS1, OS2-Oscilloscopes, Detector1, 2-Detection systems
of Bell-state, Do-photoelectric detector, RNG-random
number generator.
Fig.3 The fluctuation shapes of signal (1) and idler
(2) beams recorded by the oscilloscopes OS1 and OS2 at
Alice and Bob.
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Table I The generation of the predetermined secret key
string
AQ-Amplitude modulation signals, PQ-Phase modu-
lation signals,CD-The correlation degrees between signal
and idler beams measured by Bob, Key-The secret keys,
upper traces-The SNL of EPR beams, middle traces-the
noise spectra of signal beam, lower traces-the noise spec-
tra of X1+X2 and Y1−Y2.The measured frequency range
1.0-3.0MHz, resolution bandwidth 30KHz, video band-
width 0.1KHz. The electronic noise is about 8dBm below
that of the SNL of the EPR beams.(not indicated in the
figures)
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   T T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 
Alice AM PM PM AM AM PM 
AQ 
 
 
  
 
 
PQ 
  
  
  
Bob 
CD 
(dBm) 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 
Key 1 0 0 1 1 0 
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